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Abstract

Many changes have taken place over the past eight years in almost every sphere of the
business world. The first topic discussed within this paper will be the origin and
background of Sarbanes-Oxley, why it was necessary, and what the primary causes of
such regulation were. There are many new regulations that are required of companies,
primarily publicly-traded companies, which will be covered in the next section. Finally,
the last discussion will involve the impact of SOX and the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board on financial reporting and the changes that have taken place within
companies. The impact of this legislation, according to President Bush, was “the most far
reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt” (President Bush, 2002, para. 4).
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The Effects of Sarbanes Oxley on Current Financial Reporting Standards
Introduction
Financial reporting has changed a great deal over the past ten years. There have
been many companies that have come and gone, some with little fanfare, and some with
the explosion akin to the Macy’s Fourth of July fireworks display. There have been
various reasons why these companies have left the operating sphere: the inability to make
a profit, poor business decisions, and low marketability. However, one of the most
notable reasons why certain companies go under is unethical behavior in the workplace
(Pitt, 2009). When exposed, the lack of ethics scandalized the corporate, as well as the
public, world. In order “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes,”
Congress published the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002, para. 1). The Securities
and Exchange Commission, or SEC, enforces the application of the regulations contained
within Sarbanes Oxley. This Act dealt with intensifying financial reporting regulations
and the punishments for non-cooperation (Berman, Knight, & Case 2008). Throughout
this paper, the effects of Sarbanes Oxley, otherwise known as SOX, will be dealt with
and discussed concerning various different aspects of financial reporting.
Background of Sarbanes Oxley
Prior to 2002, the regulations on financial reporting were much more lax than they
are currently. Companies were more apt to be under the radar if they desired to engage in
fraudulent financial practices. Since the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, all
publicly-traded companies have been required to comply with regulatory policies. Many
of these policies had been in existence before SOX, but they were not enforced. This Act
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was intended to prevent potential scandals and to re-establish investor assurance (Miller,
& Pashkoff, 2002). Following high-profile cases such as Enron, which obliterated any
confidence investors may have had, SOX was a crucial piece of legislation. SOX was
also meant to reinforce corporate responsibility, strengthen disclosure, and fight against
fraud (Hoyle, Schaefer, & Doupnik, 2011). There were many corporate scandals that
occurred during the past century, but none received the amount of publicity that Enron
and its auditor, Arthur Anderson did.
The Enron Scandal
Enron scandalized the business world in 2001 and 2002 when the internal fraud of
the company was uncovered. Since its inception, Enron sustained burdensome debt. At
times the financial state of the company promised success. However, Enron never fully
recovered from the debt with which it was created. The laxity of internal control within
Enron ultimately led to the company’s demise (Thomas, 2002).
Formation of the company. Enron was created in 1985 as a result of a merger
between two companies, Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth (Thomas, 2002). The
merger saddled Enron with an enormous amount of debt which proved to be the
beginning of the end (Fusaro, & Miller, 2002). When a company begins its life on a
shaky foundation, it is safe to assume that the company will not last long without very
drastic changes. The CEO of Enron in 1985 was Kenneth Lay, who hired a consultant
named Jeffrey Skilling of McKinsey & Co. to help formulate Enron’s business plan
(Thomas). A portion of Skilling’s business plan proposed inventing a gas bank where gas
would be purchased from a system of merchants which would in turn be sold to a system
of clients, resulting in constant cash flows throughout the process (Fusaro, et al.).
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Skilling’s plan pleased Mr. Lay, and he hired Skilling to be in charge of Enron Finance
Corp., which was created in 1990 (Thomas). Over the ensuing eleven years, Skilling led
the company through a period of exponential growth. However, he was not alone during
this growth process. In 1990, following the creation of Enron Finance Corporation,
Skilling hired Andrew Fastow to be his protégé (Thomas). Fastow became the chief
financial officer in 1998, and controlled Enron’s investing and funding while Skilling
directed the enhancement of Enron’s trading operation (Thomas). One of the primary
reasons for Enron’s rapid growth was the extensiveness of the U.S. economy’s bull
market (Thomas). Unfortunately, this growth was only temporary.
The destruction of Enron. In 1996, Enron named Jeffrey Skilling as the chief
operating officer, or COO (Thomas, 2002). This position of power engendered more
greed and the temptation to pursue unethical decisions in the business policies. In
October of 1999, Enron Online, or EOL, was born (Fusaro, & Miller, 2002). EOL was a
trading website in which electronic commodities were being sold (Thomas). This
program enabled Enron to witness every business deal that occurred, and also permitted
the company to enhance Enron’s credit due to the confidence generated in a safe
purchasing environment (Thomas). Unfortunately, Enron took advantage of the growing
stock bubble by investing hundreds of millions of dollars into Internet broadband but
with minor profit. This investment did increase the stock price, which increased investor
confidence because after all, if the stock price is high, should not the company be doing
well? Sadly, the increased stock price and investor confidence masked the true condition
of Enron. As the Internet age blossomed and grew, other companies copied Enron’s
strategies, thus causing Enron to lose the edge it had held for several years (Thomas).
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With the previously set high standard, the profitability of financing deals did not concern
executives at Enron, rather they focused on keeping the numbers from appearing low
(Thomas). Enron became more of a hedge fund company rather than a trading company
(Fusaro, et al.). Eventually, Enron’s poor risk management came back to haunt the
company. Toward the end of 2001, Enron was forced to file for bankruptcy protection
(Bottiglieri, Reville, & Grunewald, 2009). The events that followed this filing proved to
be the company’s undoing. While they received the desired protection, they also were
forced to disclose faulty accounting practices, both with Enron and also with their
accounting firm, Arthur Anderson (Bottiglieri, Reville, & Grunewald). In a period of less
than a year, Enron was dissolved, and legislation, SOX, was passed in an attempt to
prevent the falsification of data and lessen the probability for insider trading to occur in
the future.
Increase in Regulations after Sarbanes Oxley
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act initiated stringent regulations. The Act was composed of
sixty-six sections, some long and others short. Each section dealt with a different part of
the reporting cycle (Schaeffer, 2006). These sections are contained within eleven titles,
primarily dealing with the issue of internal control. The eleven titles of SOX are as
follows: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, auditor independence, corporate
responsibility, enhanced financial disclosures, analyst conflicts of interest, commission
resources and authority, studies and reports, corporate and criminal fraud accountability,
white-collar crime penalty enhancements, corporate tax returns, corporate fraud and
accountability (SOX, 2002). Each of these titles has its own specific impact on different
areas of financial reporting, but only a few will be discussed in detail within this paper.
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Important Accommodations
While it is important for companies to follow every section of SOX, there have
been several sections that received more attention than others. A common section of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is Title III, Corporate Responsibility. This portion of the legislation
contains many important guidelines regarding the duties of management, including
certain audit committee requirements as seen in Section 301 (SOX, 2002). A few other
notable common sections are Section 401 (b), conditions for use of non-US GAAP or pro
forma financial information, and Section 404, internal control over financial reporting
(Rulemaking, 2009). Another very important section is covered by Title XI, Corporate
Fraud and Accountability (SOX). Title XI deals with the penalties and regulations
companies must comply with to avoid fraudulent practices. The last portion of Sox that
will be discussed is Title I, creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
or PCAOB (Rulemaking).
Corporate Responsibility
Title III of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains several important sections dealing
with corporate responsibility. While only a few will be gone into depth in this paper,
every section is incredibly vital. Each section contains a particular amount of pertinent
information for all forms of companies that comply. The eight sections of Title III are as
follows: section 301, public company audit committees (expanded below), (302)
corporate responsibility for financial reports, (303) improper influence on conduct of
audits, (304) forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits, (305) officer and director bars and
penalties, (306) insider trades during pension fund blackout periods, (307) rules of
professional responsibility for attorneys, and (308) fair funds for investors (SOX, 2002).
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Sections 302-308. Each of these sections involves a portion of corporate
responsibility. Within Title III, the entire spectrum of financial reporting is covered,
which gives credence to the importance of proper reporting. Section 302, corporate
responsibility for financial reports, deals with the specific requirements for managers and
chief executives of companies to comply with (SOX, 2002). One of these requirements is
to ensure that the financial report “does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading”
(Kranacher, 2011, para. 4). When a company’s financial statements are in order and
correctly represented, investors are able to make wiser investing decisions. In addition,
individuals are more likely to have confidence in the company (Kranacher). The next
section, improper influence on conduct of audits, is very similar to section 404 (internal
control). The legislation states actions that are prohibited:
It shall be unlawful…for any officer or director of an issuer to take any action to
fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent public or
certified accountant engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial
statements of that issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements
materially misleading. (SOX, 2002, p. 33)
Section 304, forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits, explains that if a company is
required to restate its financial statements on account of misconduct, the CEO and CFO
are responsible for compensating the company (Kleckner, & Jackson, 2004). The items
they would be accountable for in the event of misstated financial statements would be (a)
bonus or other compensation received during the 12-month time span after the issuance
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of financial statements or (b) any profits realized from the sale of securities during the
same 12-month period (Kleckner, et al., 2004). The next section under Title III covers the
penalties that apply to officers and directors when they are deemed unsuitable (SOX,
2002). These penalties also include providing “equitable relief” when necessary in order
to benefit investors (SOX). Section 306, insider trades during pension fund blackout
periods, mandates prior notice be communicated to individuals who are prohibited from
making investment changes, procuring loans, or receiving a distribution from taxqualified plans during a blackout period (Pett, Stevens, & Mao, 2003). A blackout period
is defined as the following: “periods during which participants cannot direct the
investment of their plan account balances or request loans or distributions” (Pett, et al.,
para. 1). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act expands upon this definition by specifying the time
period as “three or more consecutive business days” (Pett, et al., para. 13). Whenever a
firm decides to implement a blackout period, they are required to provide notice to the
proper individuals. This notice must include the following information: (a) the reason for
the blackout; (b) details of which transactions are affected by the blackout period; (c) the
start and end dates of the period; (d) the contact information of who can be questioned
about the blackout period (Pett, et al.). The next section, rules of professional
responsibility for attorneys, covers items that attorneys are required to report when they
are working in conjunction with an audit committee (SOX, 2002). The last section under
Title III, fair funds for investors, provides additional assistance to investors who have
been subject to the effects of fraudulent practices.
Audit committee requirements. An effectively operating audit committee is one
of the most essential elements of internal control over financial reporting (Gramling,
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Hermanson, & Hermanson, 2009). Section 301 in the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002
contains six components dealing with different requirements that are necessary for audit
committees to have (SOX, 2002). These sections are as follows: commission rules,
responsibilities relating to registered public accounting firms, independence, complaints,
authority to engage advisors, and funding (SOX). Along with complying with these
requirements, auditors are responsible to rotate their audits with another registered
auditor (Miller & Pashkoff, 2002). This rotation is meant to aid in independence and
objectivity. The SOX legislation defines an audit committee as follows:
A committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of
directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial
reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the
issuer; and if no such committee exists with respect to an issuer, the entire board
of directors of the issuer. (SOX, p. 2)
According to research conducted in 2009, since the execution of SOX, audit committee
effectiveness has improved (Gramling, et al., 2009). In order to be effective, these
committees should comply with the requirements provided in Section 301. The purpose
of those requirements is to aid in effectiveness (Gramling, et al.). A strategic weakness of
the requirement to have an audit committee is with small companies. Many small
companies are unable to provide a separate audit committee because they have an
extremely limited staff (Gramling, et al.). However, SOX section 205 has a potential
loophole for this dilemma. This section gives the provision that if a separate audit
committee is not available or in existence, the full board may act as the audit committee
(Gramling, et al.). In order to remain in compliance with independence and objectivity
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requirements, it is vital that those members of the committee are not part of management
(Gramling, et al., 2009). It can be difficult for any audit committee to remain unbiased in
every aspect of the word, but it is also important for the committee to remove any bias
from the management of the firm (Caskey, Nagar, & Petacchi, 2010). The manager has a
vested interest in the company, and rightly so, however that interest has the potential to
cause them to make poor business decisions. This is one reason why SOX was published
and then implemented: to detract from non-objective individuals in management (Caskey,
et al.).
Use of Non-U.S. GAAP or Pro Forma Financial Information
When speaking of foreign companies, most do not follow U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, hereafter referred to as GAAP. Many foreign companies
follow the International Financial Reporting Standards, or IFRS, rather than GAAP.
However, for a company that does not prepare their statements according to IFRS, the
SEC requires their financial statements to be in accordance with GAAP (Parrino, & Sung,
2009). Section 401(b) of SOX discusses the rules and regulations that concern how a
company can present figures from their financial statements and remain in compliance
with SOX (SOX, 2002). For those companies that are registered in the US, with the SEC
or PCAOB, section 401(b) requires two disclosures: (a) “a presentation of the most
comparable financial measure calculated in accordance with GAAP”; (b) “a
reconciliation of the differences between that measure and the non-GAAP measure”
(Rulemaking, 2009, para. 31). These disclosures come as a result of the SEC’s
Regulation G, adopted in January 2003 (Rulemaking). While this regulation was adopted
in January, it was put into effect until March 28, 2003 (Marques, 2006). Regulation G is
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believed by some to imply that the SEC considers more transparency and consistency in
filing and providing information to be more beneficial to investors (Marques). Prior to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC came to the realization that investors desiring to put capital
into firms who did not comply with GAAP might be mislead if the firms masked GAAP
results (Marques, 2006). Because of this realization, and as a provision to SOX, the SEC
proposed Regulation G and additional changes to the filing and furnishing rules, with the
intent “to ensure that investors and others are not misled by the use of non-GAAP
financial measures” (Marques, p. 550). The information that is now required to be
disclosed to the investors may aid them in their investing decisions. This information will
permit the investors the ability to choose if they concur with the adjustments seen in the
firm or if they prefer to reverse these adjustments (Marques). According to one
researcher, “the frequency of reporting non-GAAP earnings and other financial measures
in quarterly earnings press releases did not change with the SEC interventions” (Marques,
p. 554). This research appears to show that those firms which originally reported with
pro-forma financial statements continued to do so, and firms which did report in
accordance with GAAP continued their reporting as well. However, it is important to
point out that firms registered with the SEC in the United States must comply with
GAAP in their published financial statements, even if their own company statements
continue to be in pro-forma format.
Internal Control
Although internal control was one of the major issues being addressed in the
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, certain rules were not established until nearly a year after
the publication of SOX. One of the most important provisions of SOX is the necessity to
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employ internal controls in an attempt to prevent, detect, and deter fraud (Moffett, &
Grant, 2011). The two sections of the legislation that affected internal control the most
are Sections 302 and 404 (Thevenot, & Hall, 2011). Section 302, corporate responsibility
for financial reports, is more of a practical application of the internal controls. This
particular section requires the management of a company to (a) establish and maintain
internal controls; (b) design internal controls to guarantee that material information which
relates to the issuer and its subsidiaries is communicated to the officers with the entities;
(c) evaluate the internal controls’ efficiency within ninety days prior to the report; (d)
present their conclusions in the report concerning the effectiveness of the internal
controls based on the evaluation (SOX, 2002). Section 404, or management assessment
of internal controls, requires each annual report to contain a report on internal controls
and their effectiveness within the company (SOX). These vital sections changed the
previous reporting standards and now require management to present an analysis of the
design and efficiency of firms’ internal controls (Thevenot, et al.). Efficient internal
controls aid a business or firm with financial reporting, compliance, and operations
(Moffett, et al., 2011). However, it should be stressed that internal controls are not an
assurance that companies will be able to function with perfection. Controls may fail for
various reasons, such as poor human judgment, negligence, or simple input errors
(Moffett, et al.). However, in a report published in 2008 by the ACFE, or Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners, internal controls were able to uncover fraud in 23.3 percent of
cases analyzed (Moffett, et al.).
Section 404. The reporting requirements of SOX section 404 first became
applicable to accelerated filers in 2004. This particular section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
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mandates that company management and their external auditors testify concerning the
efficiency of internal controls over financial reporting (Moffett, et al., 2011). Section 404
also requires the firms to file their report on internal controls with the SEC in order to
divulge any noteworthy control deficiencies and material control weaknesses (Moffett, et
al., 2011). It is necessary to specify that only material weaknesses need be divulged.
Those that are not considered material are assumed to have little importance (Thevenot,
et al., 2011).
Fraud prevention. Because of all the uncertainty Enron’s meltdown caused,
many employees of companies in the United States were afraid to come forward to reveal
fraudulent practices because they feared losing their jobs. In April of 2003, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission published an addition to Section 301 of SOX
(Rulemaking, 2009). This addition provided protection to employees who would come
forward and disclose pertinent information. One of the primary purposes of a company
having internal controls in place is to prevent fraud. Without the presence of effective and
strong internal controls, companies are extremely susceptible to fraudulent activities
(Moffett, et al., 2011).
Weaknesses. A major weakness of internal control systems surprisingly comes
from the management of the company. Management has the ability to damage or
reinforce these systems by the way they interact with the company and the employees
(Moffett, et al., 2011). According to an article published in Internal Auditing by Ryan
Moffett and Gerry Grant, management override and collusion with the other individuals
employed at the firm have proven to be the largest danger (2011). In research conducted
by Maya Thevenot and Linda Hall, certain deficiencies in internal controls have been
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linked to poor accrual quality, poor board and audit committee quality, firm risk, and the
cost of equity capital (2011). Furthermore, many firms with serious control flaws have a
tendency to be smaller, less monetarily sound, have more involved operations and smaller
amounts of resources (Thevenot, et al., 2011). These firms are unable to invest the proper
funding into creating a secure system of internal controls, which causes them to be less
confident. There are two types of weaknesses: account-specific and entity-level
deficiencies. Those that are considered account-specific are regarded as less severe
because they are linked to specific financial statement accounts, such as inventory,
receivables, and intangibles (Thevenot, et al.). On the other hand, entity-level weaknesses
have a far-reaching impact on the firm. They affect larger areas, such as “recognition and
segregation of duties” and tend to be a sign of company-wide weak control environment
(Thevenot, et al., para. 14).
Corporate Fraud and Accountability
Many companies that experience fraud on any level are typically searching for
ways to lessen the potential for fraud. Title XI of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Corporate
Fraud and Accountability, seeks to alleviate the longevity of the search (SOX, 2002).
This particular section contains severe consequences for both individuals and companies
alike who engage in fraudulent practices. One such consequence applies to any individual
who attempts to tamper with documents or official proceeding. These individuals would
be subject to a fine or placed in prison for up to twenty years (SOX). Title XI contains six
applicable sections with penalties and regulations: tampering with a record or otherwise
impeding an official proceeding (1102), temporary freeze authority for the SEC (1103),
amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines (1104), authority of the commission to
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prohibit persons from serving as officers or directors (1105), increased criminal penalties
under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1106), and retaliation against informants (1107)
(SOX, 2002). Each of these sections was meant to instill a particular emotion so as to
decrease the desire to commit such practices. Section 1107 specifically states what
actions would be taken against informants:
Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any
person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any
person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information
relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. (SOX, p.
65)
Recent research provides evidence of the specific types of individuals who would take
the chance to inform the authorities of fraudulent practices. Such individuals have been
identified as (a) employees of the company, (b) industry regulators, (c) press journalists,
(d) equity holders and their analysts, (e) securities regulators, and (f) auditors (Bolt-Lee,
Farber, & Moehrle, 2011). As is evident by the variety of individuals who have been
categorized as informants, one need not be an employee of a company to discover
fraudulent information.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, or PCAOB, was created as a
result of SOX. However, the PCAOB is not an entity of the United States government,
but rather is a nonprofit corporation under the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia
(Spillane, 2004). This board is run by five members from various backgrounds. Members
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have a five-year term, with the option to serve an additional five years (Kranacher, 2008).
The primary purpose of the PCAOB is to “protect investors by improving the accuracy
and reliability of financial reports” (Kranacher, p. 1). Compliance with four key
responsibilities is required when considering the administration procedures for the
accounting-related portions of Sarbanes-Oxley: registration, standards, inspections, and
enforcement (Lauriello, Leauby, Welsh 2010).
The main purpose of the PCAOB is to ensure that registered public accounting
firms are following SOX, PCAOB regulations, SEC regulations, professional values and
also the firm’s quality control policies (Lauriello, et al., 2010). The PCAOB has not been
the easiest nor the cheapest regulation with which to comply. However, nearly a decade
after the publication of Sarbanes-Oxley, many companies are beginning to appreciate the
benefits of compliance.
Registration
Registration with the PCAOB is required by SOX. This registration period takes a
minimum of forty-five days, and could take longer if the correct information is not sent
(Berger, 2010). There are three potential actions that may occur after the initial
application is submitted: “approval, issuance of a notice of a hearing, or request for
additional information” (Berger, para. 4). The two items that would require a lengthier
registration period would be the issuance of a notice, or the request for additional
information. Once these items have been sent out, a new forty-five day period begins
(Berger). As of 2008, there were approximately 1,800 firms that had completed
registration with the PCAOB (Kranacher, 2008). The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
mandates the PCAOB to gather a preliminary registration fee and also an annual fee from
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those firms which have registered (Berger). These fees help offset some of the PCAOB’s
expenses, since it is a nonprofit organization (Berger). The due date for the annual fee is
July 31 of every year the firm is registered (Berger). Along with the registration, firms
must also file an annual report that releases selected client information (Lauriello, et al.
2010). The annual report is not to be filed past June 30 of every year, and is to encompass
a 12-month period starting April 1 of the former calendar year concluding with March 31
of the calendar year in progress (Berger, 2010). This annual report is to be made available
to the public on the PCAOB’s website, excepting that information that is considered
confidential (Berger). In order to receive confidentiality, a firm must request this
treatment on their registration application (PCAOB, 2012).
Standards
Firms that have completed the registration process with the PCAOB must then
comply with the standards that the PCAOB has deemed acceptable for both auditing and
the related verification for issuers (Lauriello, et al. 2010). According to the PCAOB
website, there are four categories from which all standards are derived: auditing, ethics
and independence, quality control, and attestation (PCAOB, 2012). Under each of these
categories, there are certain standards which existed prior to the formation of the
PCAOB, known as interim standards (PCAOB). There are also a number of new
standards which either amended pre-existing standards, or were created as the result of
ineffective policies.
Auditing standards. There are fourteen different auditing standards, or AS’s,
which are available to the public on the PCAOB website (PCAOB, 2012). They
encompass a wide scope of the auditing process, such as report references, audit

THE EFFECTS OF SOX

20

planning, materiality considerations, audit evidence, and others (PCAOB). The most
recent auditing standard, AS 15, began effectiveness on December 15, 2010 (PCAOB).
AS 5, effective as of November 15, 2007, provides instructions for reporting, which is the
final stage of any audit (Louwers, 2011). Many of these auditing standards are very
specific, and then there are those which are more general. In the same fashion as the
auditing standards, there are the interim standards. These interim standards were accepted
in April 2003, and are made up of mostly generally accepted auditing standards (PCAOB,
2012). These standards are quite extensive, including a much larger range of information
than the regular auditing standards. The interim standards are based on Statements on
Auditing Standards, or SASs, that have not been amended by the PCAOB’s Auditing
Standards (Louwers).
Ethics and independence. Similar to the auditing portion of the PCAOB
standards, the ethics and independence portion contains both new rules and interim
standards. The rules range from 3501 to 3526, but only have nine rules in place (PCAOB,
2012). The other numerals that have been left out have either been superseded by a later
numeral, or have become outdated. Underneath the umbrella of those nine rules, eighteen
additional rules are expanded on the PCAOB website (PCAOB). Some of the ethics and
independence rules that are currently in place deal with common sense items, while
others provide more detail in order to prevent particular situations from occurring
(PCAOB). As simply as individuals might desire for ethical decisions to be made,
because of so much greed and self-preservation in the world, ethics can go out the
window. These standards are an attempt to provide guidance and structure to individuals
who may struggle with maintaining ethical behaviors. The interim standards that are
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currently in place have been accepted as standards since April of 2003. These rules were
accepted by the AICPA, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and are
considered to be of as much importance as the rules (PCAOB).
Quality control. Unlike the auditing and ethics and independence sections, the
quality control portion of the PCAOB contains no new rules. This particular section holds
only the interim standards (PCAOB, 2012). These interim standards are in compliance
with the AICPA’s standards on quality control, and were accepted in April 2003
(PCAOB). Quality control only contains three interim standards specifically dealing with
the topic, but there are also five requirements of membership listed as well (PCAOB).
These membership requirements stem from the SEC, and involve continuing education
for all professionals, meeting certain informational requirements, and following proper
disclosure procedures (PCAOB).
Attestation standards. The final section of the PCAOB website that has current
application to auditors is attestation (PCAOB, 2012). Attestation provides credible
information to the management of a company (Louwers, 2011). There are six major
interim standards for the attestation portion of the PCAOB: attest engagements, agreedupon procedures engagements, financial forecasts and projections, reporting on pro forma
financial information, compliance attestation, and managements’ discussions and analysis
(PCAOB). Each of these standards has its own specific use within the attestation portion.
An attest engagement occurs when an auditor publishes a report on the financial
statements that are the responsibility of management (Louwers). In practice, the
attestation process involves the publication of the auditors’ opinion of the financial
statements (PCAOB).
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Inspections
Another important responsibility of the PCAOB is to perform inspections of those
audit firms which are registered (Lauriello, et al. 2010). These inspections occur annually
for firms which issue audit reports for more than 100 companies (Lenard, Meonske, &
Alam, 2009). According to the PCAOB website, this list includes ten firms which are
inspected annually. They are BDO USA, Crowe Horwath, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst &
Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, MaloneBailey, McGladrey & Pullen, ParenteBeard, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PCAOB, 2012). Those firms which deal with less than 100
companies are inspected once every three years (Lenard, et al.). Since the first inspection
reports were released in August of 2004, roughly 1,600 inspections have been completed
(Herron, & Gilbertson, 2011). These inspections included companies in the United States
and also around the world. The first inspections of those public firms that registered with
the PCAOB began in 2004 (Lauriello, Leauby, Welsh, 2010). During the course of these
inspections, essentially all documentation and communications dealing with particular
audits are exposed to review and evaluation (Lauriello, et al.). If during the performance
of one of the inspections, an erroneous report is discovered, the PCAOB is authorized to
take corrective action against the firm (Berger, 2010). There are three different reports
that may be issued after an inspection: an unqualified, qualified or an adverse inspection
report (Lenard, et al.). An unqualified report is the best report to receive. This report
means that no deficiencies are found during the course of the audit inspection (Lenard, et
al.). The other two types of reports are considered to be negative to receive. A qualified
report is where one deficiency is found and an adverse report is where two or more
deficiencies have been found (Lenard, et al.).
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Enforcement
The fourth and final responsibility with which the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board has been tasked is enforcement. The PCAOB’s Department of
Enforcement and Investigations carries out the enforcement program. The program can
be merely informational or antagonistic in nature (Herron, & Gilbertson, 2009). A
significant part of the enforcement process is the task of inspection. In addition to
inspection, there are two other important components: investigations and disciplinary
actions (Lauriello, et al. 2010). Once the disciplinary actions have been decided, a
company or individual will either be subject to either a hearing or adjudication. These
three components will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
Investigations. Prior to having disciplinary actions take place, the PCAOB
conducts investigations. These investigations can be either informal inquiries or formal
investigations (Herron, et al., 2009). The informal inquiry is conventionally used when
the PCAOB receives a potential violation complaint with minimal additional information
(Spillane, 2004). A formal investigation is necessary only when adequate information has
been acquired which provides evidence of a violation (Spillane). Any evidence that is
obtained through the formal investigation process is considered to be confidential and the
property of the PCAOB (Herron, et al.). However, the PCAOB has the ability to provide
said information to the SEC, the U.S. Attorney General, other federal regulators, state
attorneys general, and appropriate state regulatory authorities (PCAOB, 2012). Once the
investigation has been completed, then the PCAOB makes the decision to conduct
disciplinary action.
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Disciplinary actions. According to Rule 5200 of the PCAOB, disciplinary action
will only be taken if the alleged individual or company has breached the following: “any
provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, any PCAOB rule, any professional standard, or the
provisions of the securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of audit reports
and the obligations and liabilities of accountants with respect thereto” (Spillane, 2004,
para. 8). The PCAOB has disciplined sixty-three CPAs or firms since May 2005 (Herron,
et al., 2011). The primary reason for disciplinary action to be taken on a firm or an
individual is an act of omission (Herron, et al., 2011). It has been argued by certain
scholars that the PCAOB is not being as harsh as they could be on certain companies in
order to protect the limited competition there is in the market today (Lauriello, et al.
2010).While there are a significant amount of small audit firms in the United States
currently, there are only four major players: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst&Young,
KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (Albu, Albu, Fekete Pali-Pista, & Cuzdriorean
Vladu, 2011). If one of these firms was to be eliminated, the level of competition would
be significantly decreased. According to a study performed by David Gilbertson and
Terri Herron, disciplined firms are more likely to have fewer partners, perform more
audits on SEC issuers, and have a smaller, less financially sound clientele (Herron, et al.).
A significant portion of the disciplinary process deals with hearings and adjudication.
Each firm that has been charged with breaching any of the aforementioned items has the
option to settle the case outside of court or undergoing litigation (Modesti, 2010). For
each litigation case, the PCAOB assigns a hearing officer to be in control of the
proceedings and to issue the initial decision (Spillane, 2004). This initial decision will be
final excepting the respondent filing a “petition for review” or the board wishing to
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review said decision (Spillane). The disciplinary actions that could be taken include
suspension or removal of a firm’s registration, prohibition of an individual to be affiliated
with a registered firm, or a monetary penalty (PCAOB, 2012). These would only occur if
the initial decision made by the hearing officer, and ultimately the PCAOB, was
considered final. At that point only would these disciplinary actions come into play.
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley
Many studies have been conducted since the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
concerning the impact of this Act. Some have shown the Act in a negative light due to the
high costs of compliance (Jain, & Rezaee, 2006). In a study conducted by Jain and
Rezaee, the costs of meeting the standards imposed by SOX can range from $1 million to
over $10 million (2006). However, the same study stated that the overall effect of the Act
was an increase in the wealth of those companies that took the time and effort to comply
with the requirements (Jain, & Rezaee). Conversely, other studies have shown the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a picture of success when considering the advantages of
compliance (Verleun, Georgakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, & Vasileiou, 2011). During the
course of the study conducted by Verleun, et al., they realized that the disadvantages of
the Act must be considered in equal portion to the advantages (2011). Unless this tactic
was taken, valuable information would be considered immaterial and lost to
consideration. The conclusion of the study stated that SOX has had an overall positive
effect on the quality of accounting (Verleun, et al.). Despite many critics who believe that
such positivity cannot be sustained, the study states that this increase in quality is
sustainable, based on a five year sample period (Verleun, et al.). In answer to the critique
that the requirements of SOX are too expensive, some studies have shown that while the
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initial costs to comply can seem daunting, an average of time to cost balances it out
(Verleun, et al.). This average is calculated by dividing the amount of costs incurred by a
particular firm in order to meet the compliance requirements set by SOX by the total
amount of years that company is believed to survive (Verleun, et al.). While this theory is
evidenced by only one study in this paper, there are multiple others that could be
considered. One such study deals with the impact of SOX on “off-balance sheet supply
chain activities” (Kros & Nadler, 2010, p. 1). The result of this particular study showed
that the higher the level of compliance with SOX, the greater positivity of the effect on
the supply chain activities (Kros & Nadler).
Conclusion
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has caused many companies to reconfigure their
financial reporting methods completely. These changes have not come without costs, but
the benefits have many times outweighed the costs. Many companies have benefited from
the changes, but others have been unable to comply. However, those who have made the
sacrifices necessary to implement these changes have seen exceptional results. The
reporting standards as a whole have become more stringent since the implementation of
SOX, yet the lack of flexibility provides a certain level of structure for companies. This
structure is incredibly important in a world where nearly anything is permissible. While
these changes have required intentional adjustment, throughout this past decade the U.S.
economy has been able to avoid many meltdowns like that of Enron. Many companies
that have followed the new reporting standards have been able to adapt to the evolution
of legislation. Those that either could not or would not adapt are no longer in the market.
There is no perfect fix for any problem or difficulty that will come in the economy. Every
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instance of illegal activity or poor decision-making often stems from one simple mistake.
That mistake compounds into something that can never be undone. While legislation is
not a cure-all for these problems and mistakes, they do provide guidelines. In this writer’s
opinion, Sarbanes-Oxley was the catalyst for many more pieces of legislation to be
passed. The long-reaching effects of SOX remain to be seen, yet the evidence from the
past decade is overwhelmingly positive. Only time will tell what changes will come to be
in the future of financial reporting.

THE EFFECTS OF SOX

28
References

Albu, C., Albu, N., Fekete Pali-Pista, S., & Cuzdriorean Vladu, D. (2011). The power and
the glory of big 4: A research note on independence and competence in the context
of IFRS implementation. Contabilitate si Informatica de Gestiune, 10(1), 43-54.
Doi: 2382128631
Berger, S. (2010). A practical guide to the new PCAOB reporting requirements. The CPA
Journal, 80(2), 28-35. Doi: 1967146161
Berman, K., Knight, J., & Case, J. (2008). Financial intelligence for entrepreneurs: what
you really need to know about the numbers. Boston, MA. Harvard Business Press.
Bolt-Lee, C., Farber, D., & Moehrle, S. (2011). Highlights of corporate governance
research. Journal of Accountancy, 212(3), 34-36,38-39. Doi: 2570101731
Bottiglieri, W., Reville, P., & Grunewald, D. (2009). The Enron collapse - The
aftershocks. Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics,19. Doi: 1864838831
Caskey, J., Nagar, V., & Petacchi, P. (2010). Reporting bias with an audit committee. The
Accounting Review, 85(2), 447-481. Doi: 2004693661
Fusaro, P.C., & Miller, R. M. (2002). What went wrong at Enron: Everyone’s guide to
the largest bankruptcy in U.S. History. J. Wiley.
Gramling, A., Hermanson, D., & Hermanson, H. (2009). Audit committee material
weaknesses in smaller reporting companies. The CPA Journal, 79(12), 24-29.
Doi: 1925698771
Herron, T., & Gilbertson, D. (2009). PCAOB Enforcements: A review of the first three
years. Current Issues in Auditing, 3(2), A15-A34. Doi: 1945317931

THE EFFECTS OF SOX

29

Herron, T., & Gilbertson, D. (2011). When auditors fail to audit: Themes from PCAOB
enforcements. The CPA Journal, 81(5), 50-57. Doi: 2394795161
Hoyle, J. B., Schaefer, T. F., & Doupnik, T. S. (2011). Advanced accounting (10th ed.).
New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Jain, P. K., & Rezaee, Z. (2006). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and capital-market
behavior: Early evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research/Recherche
Comptable Contemporaine, 23(3), 629-654.
Kleckner, P. K., & Jackson, C. (2004). Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Expanded enforcement. The
CPA Journal, 74(9), 13. Doi: 703244361
Kranacher, M. (2008). The PCAOB's primary mission: Improving confidence in financial
reporting. The CPA Journal, 78(1), 14-16, 18-20. Doi: 1416445301
Kranacher, M. (2011). Full disclosure: All investors need to know. The CPA Journal,
81(4), 80. Doi: 2324673101
Kros, J., & Nadler, S. (2010). The impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on off-balance sheet supply
chain activities. Journal of Business Logistics, 31(1), 63-VIII. Doi: 2020607111
Lauriello, K., Leauby, B., & Welsh, M. (2010, April). Watching the watchers: A close
look at PCAOB after five years. Pennsylvania CPA Journal, 81(1), 20-23.
Doi: 2018933261
Lenard, M., Meonske, N., & Alam, P. (2009). PCAOB inspections: Auditor violations
and client characteristics. Journal of Finance and Accountancy, 1, 111. Doi: 2170122501
Louwers, T. J. (2011). Auditing & assurance services (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill
Irwin.

THE EFFECTS OF SOX

30

Marques, A. (2006). SEC interventions and the frequency and usefulness of non-GAAP
financial measures. Review of Accounting Studies, 11(4), 549-574. Doi: 1169512511
Miller, R. I., & Pashkoff, P.H. (2002). Regulations under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. Journal of Accountancy, 194(4), 33-36. Doi: 205772161
Modesti, C. (2010). The need for transparency in PCAOB disciplinary proceedings. The
CPA Journal, 80(11), 16-17. Doi: 2200782001
Moffett, R., & Grant, G. (2011, March). Internal controls and fraud prevention. Internal
Auditing, 26(2), 3-12. Doi: 2329679601
Office of International Affairs: SEC rulemaking and other initiatives. (2009, March
25).U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Home Page). Retrieved February
19, 2011, from http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_rulemaking.htm
Parrino, R. J., & Sung, M. (2009). SEC amends disclosure and reporting. The Journal of
Investment Compliance, 10(1), 47-50. Doi: 1882709621
PCAOB Rules. (n.d.). Public company accounting oversight board. Retrieved January
28, 2012, from http://pcaobus.org/Rules/PCAOBRules/Pa
Pett, C. R., Stevens M. L., & Mao, E. W. (2003). The impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on taxqualified retirement plans. Benefits Law Journal, 16(1), 27-59. Doi: 324885411
Pitt, H. (2009, July). Retaining ethical cultures during a weak economy. Compliance
Week, 6(66), 1,45-47,63. Doi: 1852594111
President Bush Signs Corporate Corruption Bill » Publications » The Federalist Society.
(2002, July 30). The Federalist Society. Retrieved February 24, 2011, from
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/id.302/default.asp

THE EFFECTS OF SOX

31

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. (2002, July 30). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(Documents Page). Retrieved February 19, 2011, from
www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf
Schaeffer, M. S. (2006). Accounts payable and Sarbanes-Oxley: strengthening your
internal controls. Hoboken, N.J: Wiley.
Spillane, D. K. (2004). PCAOB Enforcement: What to expect. The CPA Journal, 74(9),
32-35. Doi: 703244441
Thevenot, M., & Hall, L. (2011). Adverse internal control over financial reporting
opinions and auditor dismissals/resignations. Academy of Accounting and Financial
Studies Journal, 15(4), 41-60. Doi: 2546677211
Thomas, C. W. (2002). The rise and fall of Enron. Journal of Accountancy, 193(4), 41.
Doi: 113703156
Verleun, M., Georgakopoulos, G., Sotiropoulos, I., & Vasileiou, K. (2011). The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and accounting quality: A comprehensive
examination. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 3(5), 49-64.
Doi: 2513820831

